

# Quantum Computing and the DNS



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# The threat

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- ⦿ **In the future**, very large quantum computers may be able to determine the private keys used today in DNSSEC and TLS, as well as most other popular security protocols
- ⦿ Cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) are **not ready now** (or even soon), but might be available in future decades
- ⦿ For DNSSEC, this means that someone with such a computer **might be able to** impersonate any zone owner who signs with DNSSEC, even the root
- ⦿ For TLS, an attacker can be collecting traffic now to decrypt later with a CRQC

# Quantum computers

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- ◉ **Not at all** like any of today's common computers
- ◉ Made up of quantum bits (**qubits**), which hold quantum state
- ◉ Qubits are extremely susceptible to environmental noise, and thus need to be kept at **near-zero Kelvin** during computation
- ◉ To be **useful**, quantum computers must be better than classical computers, but we have no idea when those quantum computers can be built
- ◉ CRQCs are particularly large, and thus **harder to build**

# What can be done to prevent the cryptography problem

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- ⦿ Using bigger keys today **will only delay** when CRQCs might be useful by a few years or decades
- ⦿ New post-quantum cryptographic (**PQC**) algorithms have been developed that are not susceptible to quantum computers
- ⦿ These algorithms have **much larger keys, much larger signatures, or both**
- ⦿ PQC algorithms are an active area of research and standardization, and some are already being deployed


# Ways forward

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- ⦿ [OCTO-031](#) gives ICANN's position on what to do
- ⦿ For DNSSEC, waiting until **good PQC signing algorithms are standardized and stable** makes sense because signing keys have shorter lifetimes, and DNSSEC currently has problems with large keys and signatures
- ⦿ OCTO-031 also covers TLS (used in DNS-over-TLS, for example); in short, **let's go quickly** on these
- ⦿ Lots of work in the IETF and IRTF on analysis and standardization

# Where we are today

Landscape of Quantum Computing in 2025



# Questions?

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